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The achievement of sustainable transport is often a clearly stated objective of government 
policy, but in England there is no National Sustainable Transport Strategy (NSTS). This paper 
outlines the nature of sustainable transport arguing for a strategic approach that takes account of 
the means to reduce travel through substitution and shorter trips, as well as making best use of 
all modes and reducing reliance on carbon-based energy sources. It reviews the recent austerity 
phase of UK transport policy (2010-2015) where revenue support has been cut, but capital 
expenditure has increased, and it comments on the difficulties of making decisions on large scale 
transport infrastructure projects in the absence of a NSTS. The recent policy statements and 
initiatives on transport and sustainability are covered, looking backwards and forwards. It then 
takes the case of High Speed 2 (HS2) and identifies five main narratives in the debates over the 
arguments in support of this huge investment. It seems that sustainable transport has not been a 
central part of that debate, and there is a need to reframe the discussion on HS2, as part of a 
NSTS.  
 
Keywords: Sustainable transport policy, High Speed 2, speed, capacity, connectivity, wider economic 
impacts, image, strategic decision making. 
1. Introduction 
It is well known that transport has proved the hardest sector within which to address issues of 
sustainability and reduced carbon dependence, partly as a result of the costs of interventions 
(seen to be expensive), partly due the continuous growth in travel (particularly for longer 
distances), and partly because of the ways in which the topic has been conceptualised and 
analysed. The understandings of contemporary mobility systems are embedded in a basic 
engineering and economic perspective that sees transport problems as self-evident and requiring 
technical solutions (Macmillen, 2013). Problems such as congestion, lack of capacity, pollution 
and safety can all be addressed through investment decisions, regulation, pricing and new 
technologies, and that behavioural responses demonstrate instrumental rationality. Such 
conceptualisations of transport problems and solutions, demonstrate a simplicity that does not 
reflect the complexities of decisions that many businesses and people have to take. These 
approaches are embedded in ways of thinking about mobility systems that have arisen when 
transport policy was primarily concerned about facilitating the growth in carbon-intensive forms 
of movement (Banister, et al., 2011). 
Sustainable transport has two main dimensions. One that attempts to reduce the need for travel 
through the spatial distribution of land uses so that distances can be minimised or through the 
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use of technology to substitute for travel (e.g. through working from home). The other is to 
ensure that the most efficient form of transport is used, and that any energy needed is provided 
from renewable or non-carbon based sources. These are the essential elements of the sustainable 
mobility paradigm (Banister, 2008). In addition, there are two cross-cutting issues that link these 
dimensions together. All modes of transport (road, rail, air and sea) should be examined in a 
holistic way as part of a multimodal mobility system rather than as a set of individual modes 
competing with each other. The second aspect is that in a technological era, transport should be 
seen as a service that meets the accessibility needs of businesses and individuals. 
Much of the debate on sustainable transport in England has concentrated on cities, and 
innovative solutions have been implemented, including giving priority to pedestrians, cyclists 
and public transport, and exploring a variety of means to limit the use of cars through 
regulations and controls (Handy, 2015). More recently, innovation has been extended to cover 
mode sharing, and travel is beginning to be seen as a service. In the near future, city transport 
may be based on electric vehicles and autonomous vehicles that are hired, and some parts of the 
city may be car free. Sustainable transport is slowly becoming a reality in cities (Hickman and 
Banister, 2014). 
When considering sustainable transport for long distance journeys, the options are much more 
restricted as there are fewer options and the possibilities for integration between modes seem 
more limited. However, this is where most increase in travel has taken place in England. Since 
1972/73, there has been as slightly decline in the numbers of trips made (from 956 per person per 
year in 1972/73 to 914 trips per person per year in 2015: decreased by 4 per cent), but the average 
annual distance travelled has increased by 49 per cent (from 7161 kms per person per year in 
1972/73 to 10638 kms per person per year in 2015) (GB Department for Transport, 2016). These 
figures exclude international travel. The total time spent travelling each year has remained 
constant (about 368 hours per person per year), meaning that on average people are travelling 
faster (speed has increased by 42 per cent) and further (distance has increased by 55 per cent) for 
each trip made. All things being equal, this means that transport is becoming less sustainable 
rather than more sustainable (Banister, 2011). 
This paper addresses these questions within the context of England through reviewing recent 
policy initiatives on sustainable transport (Section 2) and a case study built around the debate 
over High Speed rail 2 (HS2) (Section 3). These substantive Sections are followed by a discussion 
on the importance of a National Sustainable Transport Strategy (NSTS) and how needs can be 
met in more integrated and sustainable ways (Sections 4 and 5). 
2. Recent Sustainable Transport Policy Initiatives in England 
The focus here is on the recent past (the post 2008 period), where the UK Government has 
pursued an austerity programme that has substantially cut levels of public expenditure from 
about 45 percent of GDP (2010) to 41.4 percent (2015)2. Transport has been one of the main UK 
Government Departments that has had its budgets cut, at least for revenue support (Tables 1 and 
2). Conversely, the investment through the capital budgets has substantially increased as a result 
of a series of major new investments, mainly in London (e.g. Crossrail and Thameslink). Table 1 
has attempted to summarise the main themes and priorities in the austerity phase of Government 
policy. On the one hand there is a desire to devolve responsibilities to the local level where there 
is greater accountability and responsiveness, but at the same time there is an equal desire to 
reduce levels of public expenditure that form the basis of central government macro-economic 
                                                        
2 In 2008, Public expenditure was £382 B and GDP was £1434 B (40.6%) – the corresponding figures for 2010 were 
£673 B and £1500 B (44.9%) and for 2015 £748 B and £1807 B (41.4%) 
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_gdp_history 
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policy. There is very little mention of sustainable transport, and at no stage has a National 
Transport Strategy been discussed. 
However, there has been a clear shift in the role that the planning system should be playing as 
the facilitator of development (often narrowly interpreted as economic development), but at the 
same time promoting sustainable development (to take account of wider social and 
environmental objectives). In many cases these two objectives are in opposition to each other, and 
this has resulted in decisions on new developments, including major transport projects, having a 
lengthy delay between the application and approval. To some extent this issue has been 
addressed in the Planning Act (2008) and in the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 
(2012), mainly through reductions in the time for consultation. But extensive delays still occur, 
mainly due to the sensitivities about the political implications of large scale infrastructure 
investment decisions (e.g. HS2 and London’s 3rd Runway). Ironically, there has been a greater 
centralisation and control over decisions on major projects, but the politicians are becoming 
increasingly wary about actually making these decisions themselves. 
Table 1. Main Policy Statements and Interventions in England on Transport and 
Sustainability – The Austerity Period (2010-2015) 
2008 Climate Change 
Act  
Sets out a legally binding target to reduce overall UK emissions by at least 80% below 
1990 levels by 2050, together with a system of five-year carbon budgets. 
2008 Planning Act  Introduced a new process for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs) - 
large scale projects (relating to energy, transport, water, or waste) that require 
‘Development Consent’. Extended in 2013 to allow certain business and commercial 
projects to opt into this process. A Development Consent Order (DCO) automatically 
removes the need to obtain several separate consents (including planning permission), 
and it is designed to be a much quicker process. The DCO process starts when an 
application is formally accepted by the National Infrastructure Planning Unit and lasts 
approximately 12-15 months. The final decision on granting a DCO rests with the 
Secretary of State, based on advice from planning inspectors – known as the 
‘examining authority’. Applications for DCOs are decided in accordance with National 
Policy Statements (NPSs), which after a process of consultation and Parliamentary 





Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George 
Osborne, explained his 
decision to spend on 
infrastructure 
“Tackling this budget deficit is unavoidable. The decisions about how we do it are not. 
There are choices, and today we make them. Investment in the future, rather than the 
bills of past failure: that is our choice. We have chosen to spend on the country's most 
important priorities: the health care of our people; the education of our young; our 
nation's security; and the infrastructure that supports our economic growth. We have 
chosen to cut the waste and reform the welfare system that our country can no longer 
afford.” George Osborne, Spending Review Statement to Parliament, 20th October 2010 
Coalition Government 
(2010-2015)  
Little enthusiasm for ‘integrated transport strategy’ policy making, preferring instead 
locally decided initiatives to deliver improvements 
Commons Transport 
Select Committee 
(2010-2015) and the 
response from the 
Department for 
Transport (DfT) 
This Committee has issued the Department for Transport with a number of 
recommendations urging a more integrated or joined-up strategy. The response from 
DfT “The Department's vision is for a transport system that is an engine for economic 
growth but is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities. 
The Business Plan clearly sets out how we are going to deliver this, including the 
development of a new high-speed railway, tackling carbon and congestion on the UK's 
roads and promoting sustainable aviation” (2011). 
2011 Securing the 
Future: Delivering the 
UK Sustainable 
Development Strategy 
This landmarkmajor policy document paid little attention to transport, apart from 
saying that it is a major contributor to carbon emissions. Measures in transport were 
mainly cleaner fuels, alternative low carbon technologies, and some mention of 
aviation as an increasing problem (pp84-85). New developments should be located in 
areas such as town centres which are accessible by means of walking, cycling and 
public transport, thereby reducing reliance on the private car (p117). 
2012 National Planning The NPPF provides a framework within which local people and their accountable 
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Policy Framework councils can produce their own distinctive local and neighbourhood plans, which 
reflect the needs and priorities of their communities.  It is framed within the UK 
Sustainable Development Strategy (2011) and there should be a presumption in favour 
of sustainable development in plan making and in decision processes. 
2015 Transport 
Priorities 
Five policy themes are 
likely to be prominent 
during the current 
Parliament (2015-
2020)- 
Devolution: Acceptance of multi-level governance and more local accountability, with 
local government taking on more responsibilities, as well as the Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, the Integrated Transport Authorities in the metropolitan areas outside 
London, and the elected Mayor and Transport for London in the capital. Central 
government retains reserved powers for ‘national’ transport, such as aviation and 
maritime policy, and strategic road and rail. The EU acts on transport issues where 
there is a transnational element – such as on almost all aviation and maritime issues, 
type approval of road vehicles, licensing, and transport networks. 
 Local bus services: Bus travel has been in long term decline since the 1950s: current 
levels are less than half of those seen in the immediate post-war years – except in 
London where it has doubled to 2.38 billion bus journeys (1986-2014). Move towards 
Quality Contract Schemes and partnership operations (Local Transport Act 2008). 
Rethinking bus routes and funding are key issues, as well as the future of 
concessionary schemes. 
 Rail franchising: Rail travel is expensive and privatisation has not worked. Rebuilding 
Rail Report (2012) stated that the cumulative quantifiable costs of the ‘privatised and 
fragmented’ railway system were somewhere in the region of £11.5 billion (p18). The 
key issues here are whether the management structure and the governance structures 
are ‘fit for purpose’. 
 Cycling: Distance has increased by 12% since 2010, and this forms a key part of the 
sustainable transport strategy. The Local Sustainable Transport Fund (LSTF) is a £550 
million fund available for local transport authorities outside of London with the aim of 
changing patterns of travel behaviour, and increasing the use of sustainable transport.  
The Infrastructure Act 2015 requires the Government to produce a Cycling and Walking 
Investment Strategy for England, setting out not only the Government’s ambitions and 
the funding implications – safety and separate infrastructure are key concerns. 
 Airport expansion: The Airports Commission concluded that based on demand 
projections, without additional capacity, major London and South East airports would 
be full by the 2040s, even with a carbon cap in place. Recommended a new 3rd runway 
at London Heathrow 
 
Sources: Butcher, L, Meakin, A and Rutherford, T (2015) Transport 2015, House of Commons Briefing Paper 
7177, 14th May 2015, p164;  
Department for Transport (2011) Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon, Cm 7996, January, p12 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3890/making-sustainable-local-
transport-happen-whitepaper.pdf;  
Department for Transport (2015) Local Sustainable Transport Fund Annual Report 2013/14, February 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/408675/lstf-annual-report-2013-
2014.pdf;   
Department for Transport (2013) Aviation Policy Framework, Cm 8584, March 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/153776/aviation-policy-
framework.pdf;  
Department for Communities and Local Government (2012) National Planning Policy Framework, March, 
http://planningguidance.planningportal.gov.uk/wp-content/themes/planning-guidance/assets/NPPF.pdf;  
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2011) Securing the Future: Delivering UK Sustainable 
Development Strategy, Cm 6467, March https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-the-future-
delivering-uk-sustainable-development-strategy; 
Airports Commission (2015) Airports Commission: Final Report, July, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/440316/airports-commission-
final-report.pdf  
Transport is seen as part of the NPPF (2012), as it contributes to sustainable development, and to 
the wider sustainability and health objectives of policy. The NPPF promotes local diversity and 
different (but appropriate) solutions being adopted in different locations. In addition, all 
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developments that generate significant amounts of movement should be supported by a 
Transport Statement or Transport Assessment Plan that takes account of the possibilities for 
reducing the amount and impact of additional traffic: “Plans and decisions should ensure 
developments that generate significant movement are located where the need for travel will be 
minimised and the use of sustainable transport modes can be maximised” (para 34). Travel Plans 
now have to be produced to demonstrate efficient delivery of goods and supplies; give priority to 
pedestrians and cyclists, together with access to public transport; creation of safe and secure 
layouts; incorporate facilities for recharging electric vehicles; and consider the needs of those 
with disabilities. These issues all form key components of sustainable transport. Although 
sustainable development provides the central element in the implementation of the NPPF, 
sustainable transport is just one of the 13 subthemes, and nationally significant infrastructure 
projects (such as HS2) are explicitly excluded from consideration (Section 5). 
Government is clearly devolving most small scale decisions to the local level, but at the same time 
maintaining control over finances and overall priorities (Table 2). It is central government that 
has identified the five issues (through their manifesto commitments – see last part of Table 1) that 
will form the main new initiatives over the next five years. Yet at the same time, central 
government is investing substantial resources in new projects (rail and road) and in encouraging 
airport development in the London region (Tables 1 and 2). There has been no progress on any 
form of NSTS, or looking at the need to reduce travel demand, or to viewing transport as a 
service, or in addressing integration between the different forms of transport. More generally, the 
debates around sustainable transport have been downgraded, as the emphasis of both austerity 
and post austerity policy has been to promote economic growth at all costs. 
Table 2. Main Expenditure Priorities in Transport – The Post Austerity Period (2015-
2020) 
2010 – 2015 
Summary (from 
Table 1) 
The DfT saw its budget cut by 17.7% (from £23.4 bn to £20.4 bn – in 2014 prices), but at the 
same time, capital spending on transport infrastructure projects increased from £7.7bn in 
2010/11 to £10.1bn in 2015/16 – a 31% increase 
2013 Rail Investment in High Speed rail 2 (HS2) from London to Birmingham and Leeds/Manchester 
2017-2026: Stage 1 to Birmingham £21.4 bn 2033: Stage 2 to Leeds/Manchester £21.2 bn 
Plus Rolling stock £7.5 bn (all at 2011 prices) 
2013 Roads £15.2 bn to strategic roads to 2012 – this is 3x the current level and will result in 80% of the 
network being resurfaced. Smart motorways and hard shoulder running. 
‘A’ roads redesignated ‘expressways’ and will also be eligible for funding 
2015 Highways Agency renamed Highways England – devolved and arms length with funding 
certainty to 2021 
2020 Roads Fund to be set up with all Road Tax from Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) being 
hypothecated to fund roads expenditure. The new VED will be the same for all cars, ending 
the carbon related charge 
Roads policy to be placed in the wider economic, technological and social environment 
Sources: Department for Transport (2011) A Fresh Start for the Strategic Road Network, An Independent 
Report Chaired by Alan Cook, November, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-fresh-start-for-the-
strategic-road-network;  
HM Treasury (2013) Investing in Britain’s Future, Cm 8669, June, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209279/PU1524_IUK_new_tem
plate.pdf; 
Department for Transport (2013) Action for Roads: A Network for the 21st Century, July, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/action-for-roads-a-network-for-the-21st-century; 
Department for Transport (2013) National Road and Rail Network: Draft National Policy Statement, 
December, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/national-road-and-rail-networks-draft-national-
policy-statement; 
Department for Transport (2015) Road Investment Strategy for the 2015/16 to 2019/20 Road Period, March, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/road-investment-strategy-for-the-2015-to-2020-road-period.  
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This is consistent with previous policy that concentrates on technical and economic solutions to 
transport problems, and the concern over greater consumer choice being seen as desirable. It does 
not address issues relating to integration across modes, the links between land use and transport, 
the carbon issues raised by transport, wellbeing and equity in access to transport. These issues, 
together with high costs (of rail) and poor quality bus services, are recognised but there has been 
little action. The different modes of transport are seen to be competing with each other rather 
than combining to provide a ‘seamless system’ that would provide a high quality service for all 
users. It is difficult to make sense of the strategic aims of this rather disjointed approach to 
transport policy, and the uncertainties that this results in for businesses and investors. 
Underlying the debate has been the controlling influence of the Treasury and the overriding 
objective of substantially reducing levels of public expenditure.  Even here, this policy has been 
applied inconsistently, and this can best be illustrated with respect to High Speed rail (HS2). 
3. Case Study – Sustainable Transport and HS2 
The debate over High Speed 2 (HS2) in the UK well illustrates the rather disjointed approach 
being taken to important infrastructure investment decisions. HS2 is a new high speed rail (HSR) 
line (300 km/hr) between London and Birmingham (Phase 1 – to open in 2026) and then to 
Manchester and Leeds (Phase 2 – to open in 2033), with a total cost (including contingencies) of 
£50 Billion (2011 prices). There have been numerous publications on the case for and against HS2, 
including GB Department for Transport (2010a and 2013), House of Lords (2015), Hall (2013), 
May and Tyler (2016), Tomaney and Marques (2013), and Butcher (2014). Many different issues 
have been raised, and five of the key narratives are used to demonstrate the different arguments 
in the debate on HS2 and sustainable transport. 
3.1 Speed 
Initially, the main benefits of HS2 were seen to be faster journeys and the core of the business 
case was travel time savings for business users. These values have subsequently been reduced by 
almost a third, but to some extent balanced by an increase in the numbers of business travellers. 
The demand forecasts were also seen as being optimistic as they were related to high economic 
growth rates, and the levels of long distance (over 100 miles). HSR demand was expected to 
increase by 1.9 per cent per annum to 2043, a rise of about 96 per cent on current levels (2011) 
(Castles and Parish, 2011, p29-30). The growth in rail (classic and HS2) will increase by three 
times, as their market share grows more than that for other forms of transport. Castles and Parish 
(2011) question the forecasts, but also the longer than usual time horizons, but they recognise the 
inherent uncertainties in all forecasts. Their best estimates for HSR demand are 30 per cent lower 
than those used in the official demand forecasts, and this fact on its own would reduce the 
Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) from 1.6 to 1.1, making the project marginal as an economic investment 
decision (Castles and Parish, 2011, Table 1). 
Overall, about 75 per cent of all user benefits have been attributed to travel time savings, and this 
level is consistent with other large scale transport investment projects (Bristow, 2016, p285). The 
way in which travel time savings are used in transport appraisal, and more generally in 
modelling, is key to demand forecasts and to the evaluation of investment alternatives.  If 
sensitivity analysis is carried out as part of the evaluation and the value of working time is set at 
the commuting rate, this reduces the BCR from 1.6 to 1.2, again making the project marginal 
(Castles and Parish, 2011, Table 1).  
If speed is placed in the framework of sustainable transport, then higher speed is not sustainable 
as more energy is used and trip distances are likely to increase (Banister, 2011). The only 
sustainable situation here would be if the electricity was generated from ‘clean’ sources, but the 
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UK energy mix3 (2015) is still heavily carbon based, with under half being generated from 
renewables (25 per cent) and nuclear sources (21 per cent). From a sustainability perspective, the 
more flexible concepts of ‘reasonable travel time’ and travel time reliability may be more 
appropriate ways to determine investment priorities, as speed is only one part of the travel 
experience (Banister et al., 2016). The real value of travel time savings is only realised if the saved 
time is used to increase output and productivity, and the productive use of time whilst travelling 
by rail is an important element in this debate. The real value of ‘saving’ time and the associated 
energy costs of high speed have not been central parts of the HSR debate. 
3.2 Capacity  
The second narrative has focused on the need for additional capacity, and HS2 was seen to be the 
best way to deliver this. This reasoning was behind investment decisions to build the Shinkansen 
in Japan and the TGV in France (Givoni, 2006), and more recently the HSR in China (Fu et al. 
2012). In the UK, the need for HS2 was accentuated by the forecast growth in the demand for rail, 
especially on the West Coast Main Line4, and expected lack of peak capacity. Part of the concern 
here has been with the reliability of rail travel, but it also covered the overcrowding of trains.  
The initial HS2 plans included 18 train services per hour from London at peak, when each train 
can provide over 1000 seats (2 sets of 200m long trains). This capacity will not only serve demand 
on the HS2 route, but importantly it will free capacity on the conventional network as a result of 
the diversion of some demand to the HS2, and it will also allow more track capacity for use by 
freight trains. All these factors together serve several policy goals, including shift of freight 
transport from road to rail, and they are expected to form the large bulk of the economic benefits 
of HS2.  
Doubts have been raised whether it is technically feasible to run 18 trains per hour. In 
comparison, Eurostar normally operates three trains per hour and can increase this to five at 
peak, while in Japan and France, where there is a much longer tradition of HSR operations, 12 
trains per hour is the maximum frequency achieved5. The demand for 18 trains per hour (a 
maximum of about 18,000 passengers per hour) is only likely to exist at the peak, but demand 
will be much lower at other times.   
Capacity increases on rail provides an important element in the sustainable transport debate, as 
trains running with high load factors are efficient users of energy. The real question here is over 
whether that capacity increase can best be provided through a dedicated HSR system, or through 
additional capacity in the conventional rail system. There are also possible abstraction impacts, as 
diverting demand and services from the conventional network to HS2 could result in lower 
quality services to the passengers remaining on these routes.  HSR only serves the main cities and 
does not stop at the intermediate cities. The new HSR line may also abstract a higher proportion 
of the operating and maintenance resources, and this may have a detrimental impact on the 
conventional network, further suppressing demand (as has happened in France – Cour des 
Comptes, 2014).  
Investment in HS2 provides an increase in capacity on a very specific route, benefiting a few 
locations (stations), and suggestions have been made about whether there are cheaper ways of 
providing additional capacity. These suggestions have included longer trains, reconfiguring 
trains, more standing room in trains, investing in signalling and other control systems, and the 
use of peak pricing methods (Starkie, 2013). Many other lines in the South East are far more 
congested than the proposed route of HS2, and Castles and Parish (2011, p17) have commented 
that the capacity of the standard class seating on the WCML can be more than tripled from the 
                                                        
3 http://www.energy-uk.org.uk/energy-industry/electricity-generation.html 
4 WCML is the West Coast Main Line in the UK that runs from London, through Birmingham, Manchester, and 
Liverpool to Glasgow in Scotland. 
5 Response to questions 82-83 in the Oral evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee, 21 June 2011, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/uc1185-i/uc118501.htm 
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2008 base at a relatively low cost. A slower rail network might be more reliable and provide more 
capacity to a greater number of travellers, and the contribution of the rail system as a whole to 
sustainable transport would be increased.       
3.3 Connectivity  
Connectivity covers the ease of getting from one’s origin to one’s destination, and speed here 
plays a role, but it is the average speed door-to-door (not the maximum speed) and ease (or 
inconvenience) of transfer between modes of transport that is central. Although it is the main (the 
high speed) part of the journey that receives most attention, and this is the part of the journey 
that will cost the most to provide or improve, the potential in reducing overall travel time door-
to-door is most likely to be achieved by interventions at the station and in improving its 
accessibility by other modes of transport (Givoni and Rietveld, 2007; Brons et al, 2009). 
Railway stations are the access points to rail services. Yet, the nature of HSR suggests a low 
number of intermediate stations along the route, as each stop can 'cost' up to 15 minutes6, making 
HSR more difficult to access. HSR in this respect might be viewed like an airport, although a 
noticeable advantage HSR has is that its station(s) are often in the city centre. But city centre 
location is costly, due to the size of the station (each train can be 400m long) and the need to 
traverse densely populated areas, often requiring tunnelling. City outskirt location could reduce 
such costs, but this option will make the station even less accessible for most passengers (Banister 
and Givoni, 2013). It is here that there should be strong links with sustainable transport, as HSR is 
part of the total transport network, and access to and egress from HSR stations should be seen as 
part of the overall journey. To compensate for the low number of stations, HSR should be fully 
integrated with the rest of the transport network, and it is this integration that will increase 
connectivity, namely the ease of getting from the trip origin to many different destinations (e.g. in 
Taiwan; Chou et al., 2011; and in the UK at Birmingham; Martínez Sánchez-Mateos and Givoni, 
2012). Yet here again, there seems to have been little discussion over how HSR is integrated with 
and how well it is connected to the conventional rail system and other modes of transport. 
3.4 Wider Economic Impacts (WEI)  
These three narratives all relate to the transport elements of HS2, but there are also two other 
issues that have featured in the debates. Justification of investments in HSR has been increasingly 
based on the wider economic benefits, including employment, regeneration and agglomeration 
benefits. The Department for Transport have estimated that HS2 would create 3,100 permanent 
jobs in operating the new railway and around 24,600 temporary jobs (excluding the supply chain) 
during construction. There might also be up to 400,000 jobs in additional developments in areas 
close to HS2 stations (House of Commons, 2013, para 34). These estimates were based on a report 
prepared for the Core Cities Group7 by consultants (Volterra/Arup, 2011, p2), and they are 
controversial. It is not clear that investment elsewhere in the economy, for example in improving 
and developing the conventional rail network or investments outside the transport system (in 
education), would not provide similar or greater employment benefits.    
A considerable amount of research has been carried out on the agglomeration effects, mainly 
with respect to intra-regional changes, and the key question here is whether they are also found 
on an inter-regional scale as well (Graham and Melo, 2010). The basic argument is that improved 
connectivity within a city or region can compound the benefits of agglomeration by making 
spatial economic transactions between firms and other organisations more efficient through 
mechanisms such as sharing, matching and learning (Duranton and Puga, 2004). There are 
difficulties here in the specification of the relationships and in their measurement, and in the 
                                                        
6 Connor P (2011) Rules for High Speed Line capacity, Railway Technical Web Pages: http://www.railway-
technical.com/Infopaper%203%20High%20Speed%20Line%20Capacity%20v3.pdf 
7 The cities concerned are Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, and 
Sheffield. 
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implied causality (including the strength of the statement – whether agglomeration effects cause 
higher output or productivity). Graham and Melo (2011) examined long-distance travel flows in 
Britain to provide an indicative assessment of the potential order of magnitude of agglomeration 
benefits, resulting from travel time reductions. They draw conclusions from this analysis by 
making inferences as to the likely effect on HSR and conclude that (p15) "even in the best case 
scenario for the improvement in long-distance travel times and the market share of classic and 
high-speed rail, the potential order of magnitude of the agglomeration benefits is expected to be 
small." They qualify their conclusion by saying that their analysis refers to the domestic market 
but "benefits could also arise from improved connections to continental Europe (e.g. Paris, 
Brussels, and Amsterdam) by linking HS2 to HS1" (ibid). From this econometric analysis, it seems 
that the agglomeration effects observable at the intra-regional level are either not apparent or are 
difficult to measure (or both) at the inter-regional level, where HS2 is likely to have most impact. 
In terms of sustainable transport, agglomeration benefits are important as they could shorten trip 
lengths and allow firms to operate more efficiently, but conversely there could be an increase in 
commuting journey lengths as labour market areas are extended. 
3.5 Image 
The final narrative has been that HSR is seen as promoting a modern view of transport and the 
UK is lagging behind its European neighbours and international competitors. Unlike many other 
countries like Spain, Italy, Germany and France, and those outside Europe, such as Japan and 
China, the UK (where rail transport was invented) has not joined the HSR era, despite one short 
high-speed line (HS1). The UK rail network is perceived as being old, crowded, and unreliable, 
and this could reflect on the whole image of the country. The speed of the HSR is central in the 
image of an advanced, state-of-the-art rail development and technology. High-speed was 
originally considered to be over 200km/hr, and this maximum speed has been increased to 
350km/hr (the maximum operating speed of French and Chinese HSR), so it is not surprising 
that the HS2 was originally designed with a maximum operating speed of 400km/hr8. Image 
depends on whether the perceived efficiency of the rail transport system of a country influences 
the overall perspective of foreign investors and companies about whether they should invest in 
that country.  
Governments are accountable to the electorate, but major decisions like HSR require cross party 
support and a clear promoters to push the decisions through the Parliamentary processes 
(Dudley and Banister, 2015). A recent example of this change has been from David Higgins, the 
Chairman of HS2 Ltd, the executive agency charged with implementing the HS2 project. He has 
stated that HS2 responds to a “national need” and that HS2 is a “catalyst for change”, as there is a 
lack of rail capacity South of Birmingham and a lack of connectivity in the North, both between 
the northern cities and to the south. He is now trying to build a strong consensus and an alliance 
around these overtly political and emotional images (GB Department for Transport, 2014). 
4. Reframing HS2 as part of a National Sustainable Transport Strategy 
(NSTS) 
Sustainable transport has not featured strongly in the debate over HS2. It is the economic factors 
that have dominated the discussion, even though each of these main components has been 
challenged. Business has cast doubts over the value of the project. For example, the CBI 
(Confederation of British Industry) originally supported HS2 but later cast doubts on its business 
case, by stating “Important questions need to be answered before we undertake a project of such 
significance, in particular about how the project would be financed and managed as well as how 
                                                        
8 Raising the speed from 300 to 360 km/h increases energy consumption by 23 per cent,  
http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/hs2%20traction%20energy%20modelling.pdf 
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a new high-speed rail network would complement existing transport networks” (CBI, 2010, p1). 
The CBI also stated that HS2 could strengthen long term economic prospects, but that six 
conditions would need to be met if business support was to be guaranteed. These conditions 
were that the government must - ensure commitment to the full high-speed network; promote 
international gateways and networks; get private sector funding agreed before construction 
starts; safeguard any negative effects on rail freight; safeguard spending in other areas of 
transport capital spending; and support climate change objectives. The issue of finance has been 
notable by its absence from all of the analysis, even though it is implicitly accepted that the 
project would be publicly funded. The concern over complementing the existing transport 
network is part of the connectivity theme, and this in turn is strongly linked with integration of 
the transport system.  
The Institute of Directors (IoD) has called for the Government to abandon HS2, branding it as “a 
grand folly” (IoD, 2013). A survey of IoD members found that 27 per cent felt that HS2 represents 
good value for money and 70 per cent stated that the scheme would have no impact on the 
productivity of their business. The IoD survey reported that only 6 per cent of Directors say they 
never work on the train, with 48 per cent saying that they spend at least half the journey working, 
and a further 26 per cent work for between a quarter and half the time, and 21 per cent spend up 
to a quarter of the journey time working – their conclusion is that work is an essential part of 
travel by high speed rail and that travel time is productively used. This comment links in with 
the wider economic impacts of HSR, and the view that such an investment would not be 
transformative on its own, but only if other conditions were present. These essential supporting 
conditions cover non-transport factors such as a high quality labour force, agglomeration 
economies, positive externalities, network economies, inward investment, a supportive planning 
system, complementary policies – see Banister and Berechman, 2000, pp318-320). 
However, it is on the three other transport headings (speed, capacity and image) that a NSTS 
could be framed. A sustainable transport strategy would promote shorter and slower journeys, 
strengthen the positive travel experience (including reliability and seating), and see HSR as an 
integral part of a NSTS and not just as a single (important) link in that network. It is here that the 
environmental lobby has been unable to provide a coherent strategy that might redress the 
balance away from the overriding economic (and political) focus of the debate towards one that 
addresses sustainable transport. In sustainable mobility terms HSR offers an effective alternative 
to continued investment in roads, but at the same time it has substantial environmental impacts, 
particularly if it passes through environmentally sensitive areas, such as the Chiltern Hills 
(Cornet et al., 2016). Rather than oppose HS2 on sustainability grounds, the environmental 
groups have sought to mitigate its local impacts. 
The environmental lobby has joined the promoters of HS2 (2011) by signing up to The Right 
Lines Charter, which was initiated and organised by the Campaign to Protect Rural England 
(CPRE) with assistance from the Campaign for Better Transport (CBT). The Charter stated that 
HSR must reduce the damaging impact of travel on the environment by shifting journeys from 
road and air to rail, and that in addition HSR represented only one option for increasing rail 
capacity and connectivity (Section 3). The Charter criticised the government for its HS2 proposals 
not being part of any comprehensive long term transport strategy, and also called for the adverse 
environmental impacts to be minimised. The concept of the NSTS is embedded in the Charter, 
but the basic support for the principle of HS2 has inevitably provided the main focus for 
discussions, and the wider issues of the sustainable transport strategy have been downgraded. It 
was therefore highly significant that the signatories to the Charter included not only members of 
the environmental establishment, such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the 
Wildlife Trusts, the Woodland Trust and the Ramblers, but also more radical groups such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. 
The links between the environmentalists and the pro HS2 interests were further strengthened in 
2012 with the setting up of the HS2 Environment Round Table. This consisted of representatives 
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from a wide range of environmental groups, the Department for Transport (usually including 
ministers), and HS2 Ltd. The Round Table was to discuss high level principles concerning the 
project, including the engagement/decision making processes, environmental sustainability, and 
how HS2 fits into wider strategies. This might be seen as the means to address the need for a 
NSTS, but the environmental lobby had now become political ‘insiders,’ while the Round Table 
has fitted in well with the objectives of the government and HS2 Ltd, as they have retained tight 
control of the agenda. 
The main advantage of the Round Table for government has been the acceptance by the 
environmental lobby of the need in principle for HS2, with the discussion being over the detail. 
Significant additional mitigation has been achieved at the local level, with 21 percent of the 
London to Birmingham route now being in tunnels. But the environmental lobby and those 
opposed to HS2 have not been able to build a coordinated national campaign against HS2, as was 
the case with roads (Dudley and Richardson, 2000). Those opposed to HS2 have sought to fill the 
gap left by the environmental lobby by forming unexpected alliances, such as with right wing 
free market parties and groups including UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) and the 
Taxpayers’ Alliance, who oppose HS2 chiefly on the grounds of its public expenditure costs.  
The dilemmas that the environmentalists have faced in defining the sustainability of a project 
such as HS2, illustrate how these ambiguities are defined have a profound influence in 
determining its political success or failure. The development of a NSTS is no further advanced, as 
the framework within which decisions on major infrastructure projects can be placed. The 
decision process has been changed with those traditionally seen to promote sustainable transport 
now being seen as insiders in the process, and their role is to mitigate environmental impacts, 
rather than challenge the project as a whole. In the meantime, the HS2 project remains on course 
for Parliamentary approval (2017). 
5. Conclusions 
Three important lessons can be learned from the HS2 experience and they help make the case for 
a NSTS. First, strategic decisions in transport now seem to be based on their legacy value. One 
basic question here is the extent to which analysis and expertise can help in making decisions that 
take more than 10 years to realise (HS2 Phase 1 will open in 2026 and Phase 2 in 2033) or at least 
three Parliaments, and where the main beneficiaries are today’s young or tomorrow’s people. 
Over 70 per cent of current rail users are between 25 and 60 years of age (GB Department for 
Transport, 2010b), but the main beneficiaries of HS2 will be future generations.  
Secondly, there is still a need for analysis, but narrow based Benefit Cost Ratios are too restricted 
in terms of their assumptions and they have proved to be unreliable, being over optimistic in 
both their demand forecasts and their cost estimates (Flyvbjerg, 2007). The current debate over 
whether travel time, particularly by HSR where distances (and times) are long, is wasted or 
productive continues, but it is clear that travellers in the future will be able to make more use of it 
than at present and in ways that we have not currently thought about. Analysis that depends on 
the wider economic impacts is also currently limited, as issues around causality, whether 
employment opportunities are new (and permanent) or transfers between locations, the 
treatment of time, and the role that external factors play (economic, social and technological), all 
contribute to increased uncertainty. 
Thirdly, throughout the debate there has been very little said about the costs of HS2, who should 
pay for it, and who are the main beneficiaries of HSR. Although HSR provides an attractive 
political alternative, it should not be at the expense of reductions of investment in other parts of 
the rail (or transport) network. This issue was highlighted in the Cour des Comptes (2014) report 
on the French railways, and they have called for new HSR projects to be accompanied by greater 
guarantees of relevance and profitability. The Cour des Comptes (2014) also noted that the users 
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of HSR mainly come from the higher income groups, with users of other rail services 
representing a much wider range of income groups. 
New approaches are needed to major project analysis that accepts the complexity of the issues 
that engages with all interested parties, that explicitly includes uncertainty, and that is holistic 
and system-wide in its scope – that would suggest a National Transport Strategy, and preferably 
one that embraces sustainable transport (i.e. the NSTS). At present it seems that major investment 
decisions are treated as being political, but even here there also needs to be long term strategic 
stability that can provide continuity between Parliaments. This continuity is necessary to give 
confidence to investors and to provide the means to have clear accountability in Parliament.  
The new National Infrastructure Commission (October 2015) might provide the means to have an 
open and clear debate about alternative strategies that would address all forms of transport, and 
think strategically about longer term futures (HM Government, 2015). The acceptance that 
independent advice should be given on major long-term infrastructure priorities is welcome and 
its role has now been made a permanent executive agency (January 2017). However, even though 
there is a recognition of the importance of advice, it is still given on a project by project basis, and 
it does not address the primary issue being argued here, namely to provide a NSTS for England 
that can bring all the advice together into a coherent strategy. The National Infrastructure 
Committee may make such a move less likely.  
Achieving sustainable transport in long distance travel in England is a much tougher objective 
than in cities where there are many attractive alternatives. Rail offers huge potential to play an 
important complementary role to road in a NSTS for long distance travel, but the question that 
has been addressed in this paper is whether HSR should play a central part in that strategy. We 
do not know what future generations will do with their time, or how much and where they will 
be travelling, or the potential for new types of activities and the untapped power of technological 
innovation. Within this set of choices, the role for HSR might be substantial or very limited. This 
does not seem to have been a debate that the great Victorian railway pioneers had and we are 
grateful for that, but the question still remains as to whether we should do the same now. 
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